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PROPERTY RIGHTS IN HUMAN B ODIES AND B ODY PARTS 
ABSTRACT 
In light of increasing advances in medicine and biotechnological research, a 
new perception of value has developed in the human body and its body parts. 
This has consequently created a new area requiring to be regulated by the 
law, and one suggested method is by instilling property rights in the human 
body. Statutes and case law have traditionally held that there are no property 
rights in the human body, which is reflected in New Zealand's current legal 
framework and cultural environment. This paper submits that property rights 
are both inappropriate and unnecessary to regulate the human body and body 
parts . Property rights are inappropriate because of various moral objections 
agamst labelling people as property, as well as the undesirable practical 
consequences of the commodification of body parts. Property rights are 
unnecessary because the existing law can adequately manage current and 
future circumstances through a combination of methods including criminal 
law, tort law, fiduciary law, fundamental rights, privacy and informed 
consent. For all the apparent ease of using property rights, they are a danger 
to who we are as people and therefore should - and can - be avoided. 
Word Length 
3 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 13,500 words. 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN HUMAN B ODIES AND B ODY PARTS 
I INTRODUCTION 
Legal taxonomy is purposive. Objects are treated as property, for example, 
not because they have some intrinsic or objectively measurable characteristic 
that identifies them as property, but rather because labelling them as 
property, and thereby subjecting them to property law, best effectuates a 
broad range of social, philosophical, psychological and economic goals. 
Accordingly, legal classificat10n is the antithesis of a technical or objective 
exercise. It is a normative process. It is rooted in value judgements and 
entails makmg fundamental policy choices. 1 
4 
Somebody once calculated that the "value" of the human body, when broken 
down into its chemical components, was little more than one or two dollars.2 
While such a useless fact has little more value than a conversation starter, it 
illustrates the subjective nature of "value" with respect to the human body, and 
notably how our perception of this value has changed. 
Much of the reason for this change is associated with development in 
technology; it is of common occurrence in recent times that legal theorists are 
forced to readdress fundamental questions in light of new technology that 
challenges existing views. Deve opments m biotechnology, organ 
transplantation and in vitro fertilisation have all contributed to a change in the 
"value" of a human body and it's parts. This has inevitably raised new 
questions about what can and cannot - and should and should not - be regarded 
as "property" . 
Advances in technology have lead to opportunity for increased commercialism. 
Such commercialisation requires a legal framework to determine an 
individual's rights ( especially with respect to remuneration) . 3 One such 
1 Moe M Litman "The Legal Status of Genetic Material" in Bartha Maria Kuoppers (ed) Human 
DNA : Law and Policy - international and Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 1997) 17, 17 ["The Legal Status of Genetic Material"]. 
2 Russell Scott The Body as Property (Viking Press. New York, 1981) 3 [The Body As 
Property]. 
3 Randy W Marusyk and Margaret S Swain "A Question of Property in the Human Body" 
(1989) 21 Ottawa L Rev 351,351 ["A Question of Property"]. 
PROPERTY RlGHTS IN HUMAN BODIES AND BODY PARTS 5 
approach to this framework is the recognition of property rights in the human 
body and, for practical purposes, it's constituent parts. It has been proposed that 
the common "bundle of rights" attributed to property - for example the right to 
possess, the right to use and manage, the right to income, the right to security, 
and the power of transmissibility4 - would be suitable to govern this new 
medico-legal area. 
While it is done with good intentions, the adoption of property rights in the 
human body has potential dangers. This paper argues that a property regime is 
both inappropriate and unnecessary for the human body. It is inappropriate due 
to a number of moral objections, public policy arguments, and practical 
consequences. It 1s unnecessary because existing law may be sufficient to 
manage the situation, and if not then there are other more viable and suitable 
options than property rights. It is maintained that alternatives to property rights 
are equally or more effective and appropriate to control the use of the human 
body. However it is first necessary to look at the development of the law 
relating to property rights in human bodies, and the current legal framework 
operating in New Zealand. 
4 
See Laurence C Becker Property Rights: Philosophical Foundations (Routledge Kegan & 
Paul, London, 1977). 
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II HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BODIES 
The notion of property rights in living human bodies is not new; however 
historically it was applied to the ownership of another person. While slavery is 
the obvious example, it was also accepted that a wife ' s body was her husband ' s 
property, and a that debtor could be regarded as part of payment for a debt. 5 
The general historical rule is that there is no property right in a dead body. 
However it is a rule not without contention, having varying interpretations and 
qualifications in different jurisdictions. 
A The United Kingdom and Australia 
A no-property rule has existing in England for hundreds of years. Blackstone 
wrote in 1765 that "stealing a corpse itself which has no owner (though a 
matter of great mdecency), is no felony ."6 However justification for this 
statement and similar other statements made by classical common law writers 
have dubious authority; they either quote each other or rely on cases which may 
not have in fact developed such a rule. 7 
Judicial recognition of a no property rule can be traced back to the ecclesiastical 
courts, and specificall y Haynes Case8 in 1614. William Haynes was indicted for 
the theft of burial sheets, and it was necessary to determine with whom the 
property should be laid in the indictment. The judges stated that, "the property 
of the sheets remain in the owners, that is, in him who has property therein, 
when the dead body was wrapped therewith; for the dead body is not capable of 
it ... "9 It seems obvious that the case was deciding whether dead bodies could 
5 Stephen Ashley Mortinger "Spleen for Sale: Moore v Regents of the University of California 
and the Right to Sell Parts of Your Body" (1990) 51 Ohio St L J 499, 503 ["Spleen for Sale"]. 
6 The Body As Property above 112, 7. 
7 P Matthews "Whose Body? People as Property" (1983) 36 Current Legal Problems 193, 198 
["Whose Body?"]. 
8 Haynes Case 12 Co Re 113, 77 ER: Susan Palu "Whose Body is it Anyway?" (1992) NZLJ 
427, 428. 
9 "Whose Body?" above 117, 197. 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN HUMAN B ODIES AND BODY PARTS 7 
own property rather than whether they are property; however it is from cases 
such as this that the no-property rule was established. 10 
The first authoritative statement came in 1857 in R v Sharpe .II Sharpe, a 
religious dissenter, was convicted of breaking and entering into a Church of 
England graveyard and removing his mother's corpse. In his judgment Erle J 
declared "our law recognises no property in a corpse" 12 supposedly following 
precedent from R v Lynn. 13 Lynn was a case concerning a "resurrectionist", 
which less fancifull y put is a grave-robber, which was, at the time, a lucrative 
business due to incessant demand from universities and medical colleges for 
bodies to dissect. Body-snatching remained a problem in England until 
Parliament enacted the Anatomy Act in 1832, and also by giving educational 
institutions greater and more legal access to cadavers.14 However the difficulty 
with relying on the Lynn case is that Lynn was not charged with larceny (but 
rather for disinterring the body), and so issues of ownership did not arise_ Is 
Therefore some commentators dismiss Erle J' s comment in Sharpe that there is 
no property in the human body as obiter, but others interpret it as ratio for 
denying a particular claim of defence; due to its brevity the reported judgment 
unfortunately does not make this clear. 16 
A clearer pronouncement of the law is made in Williams v Williams, 17 which 
while denying any proprietary right in a corpse, allowed limited rights of 
possession by executors for the purpose of burial. The deceased had indicated 
to Williams that he wished his body to be cremated, but instead the executors 
buried the body. Williams got permission to exhume the body and have it 
reburied in another cemetery, but then she took it to Italy to be cremated. 
10 See also Excelby v Handyside (1749) 2 East PC 652 where while it was reported that "no 
person had any property in corpses" . the authority is doubtful as the case was decided 15 years 
before the birth of the reporter; "Whose Body is it Anyway?" above n8, 428. 
11 R v Sharpe (1857) Dears & Bell CC 160; 169 ER 959 [Sharpe]. 
12 Sharpe above n 11, 960. 
13 "Whose Body?" above n7, 199. 
14 The Body as Property above n2, 4. 
15 "Whose Body" above n7. 199. 
16 
Debra Mortimer "Proprietary Rights in Body Parts: The Relevance of Moore 's Case in 
Australia" (1993) 19 Monash U LR 217, 236 ["Proprietary Rights"]. 
17 Williams v Williams (1882) 20 Ch D 659. 
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Williams then claimed expenses from the executors, and it was necessary to 
determme whether she was lawfully in possession of the body, and if so what 
rights that entitled her to . Kay J held that there was no property in a body, 
relying on Sharpe. Commentators have noted that Kay J draws no distinction 
between buried and unburied bodies, 18 although the effect of any such 
distinction (and the ability to draw an identifiable line between the two) 1s 
questionable. 
What is significant about Williams is that the personal representatives of the 
body are given limited rights over it; only possessory rights and only for the 
purpose of disposal. It illustrates how certain attributes of property - namely 
possession - are not necessarily proof that such a property right exists. 19 Of 
course this conclusion does depend on how "property" is defined. Some 
commentators consider that a reduced level of rights, powers or duties ( a lesser 
"bundle" of rights) amounting to anything less than full ownership can also be 
called "property". 20 However in the case of Williams these rights are so limited 
- in duration, extent and purpose - that to call them property rights seems 
overly artificial. 21 Furthermore, avoiding the use of property rights altogether 
removes the difficult necessity of determining what rights and how many rights 
(how big a "bundle") would constitute "property" . Such an imprecise line 
would be hard to decide upon. 
An interesting qualification to the no-property rule came from the Australian 
High Court decision in Doodeward v Spence. 22 It was held that the corpse of a 
two-headed stillborn baby could be the subject of an action in detinue. The lead 
judgment stated that on principle a human body may be the subject of property, 
but in this case the presentation and preparation of the foetus meant it had been 
so changed by lawful exercise of human skill that it could no longer be regarded 
as a mere corpse. It has been commented that the conflicting reasoning of the 
judgments in Doodeward make it dubious authority for the attachment of 
18 "Whose Body?" above 117,2 11. 
19 "Proprietary Rights" above 11 16, 238. 
20 "Whose Body?" above 117, 194. 
21 "Proprietary Rights" above n 16, 238. 
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property rights to human bodies. 23 Griffiths CJ accepted that while a body may 
be property, the skill and labour had changed the foetus in this case. Barton J 
agreed with the Chief Justice on the end result (that the foetus was no longer 
technically a body), but found that a human body could never be property. 
Alternatively, Higgins J in his minority judgment relied on English authorities 
already mentioned, that a body can never be property and this included altered 
or preserved foetuses. 
While the facts are historically redundant, the case raises other issues more 
relevant to contemporary scenarios; what skill or labour would create property 
rights in body parts, especially from biotechnology? The majority in 
Doodeward would support the argument that ownership should go to the "first 
knowing appropriator" of benefit from the human tissue, rather than it' s original 
donor.24 The case also raises questions where the value obtained is not from the 
body itself, but from genetic information extracted from it. These concerns will 
be addressed later in the paper. 
The English Court of Appeal recently affirmed the no-property rule in Dobson v 
North Tyneside Health Authority.25 In that case the plaintiff had previously 
collapsed and been taken to the defendant hospital where they were discharged. 
Two months later it was discovered that the plaintiff had two large brain 
tumours, and soon after they died . Another hospital (the second defendant) 
removed the deceased ' s brain pending further investigation which was not 
pursued, and so the brain was disposed of Three years later, the deceased' s 
mother wished to sue the fi rst defendant hospital for negligence, and so the 
second hospital was also sued for failing to retain the brain for the purposes of 
that civil litigation. 
22 Doodewardv Spence (1908) CLR 406. 
23 Roger S Magnusson "The Recognition of Proprietary Rights in Hwnan Tissue in Common 
Law Jurisdictions" (1992) 18 Melb U LR 601 , 606. 
24 J W Harris "Who Owns My Body?" (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 55 ["Who 
Owns My Body?"] 
25 Dobson v North Tyneside Health A uthority [ 1997] 1 WLR 596 [Dobson]. 
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The claim was unsustainable as the case depended on the executor' s right to the 
brain in which no property existed. Gibson LJ declared : "in the present state of 
the English authorities there is no property in a corpse".26 Having said that, he 
identified two possible qualifications; possessory rights for the purpose of 
burial, and for the application of human skill such as stuffing or embalming. 
While the first exception was accepted, Gibson LJ found the second proposition 
only "properly arguable". 27 Even if a skill and labour exception did exist, it was 
found not to apply to mere post mortem preservation of the brain. 
B United States 
The United States of America have appeared more willing to recognise a wider 
range of property rights in human bodies.28 For example in Pierce v Proprietors 
of Swan Point Cemetery, 29 another case involving unauthorised disinterment of 
a body by aggrieved family members, it was stated by Potter J:30 
That there is not right of property in a dead body, using the word in its 
ordinary sense, may well be admitted. Yet the burial of the dead is a subject 
which interests the feelings of mankmd to a much greater degree than many 
matters of actual property. There is a duty imposed by the universal feelings 
of mankind to be discharged b some one towards the dead; a duty, and we 
may also say a right, to protect from violation; it may, therefore, be 
considered as a sort of quas1 property, and it would be discreditable to any 
system oflaw not to provide a remedy m such a case. 
The judge goes on to say that the person in charge of the body is by far from the 
owner, but instead holds it in a "scared trust for the benefit of all who may from 
family or friendship have an interest in it". 31 Interestingly, the way this 
26 Dobson above n 25, 600. 
27 PD G Skegg "The No Property Rule And Rights Relating To Dead Bodies" (1997) 5 Tort 
Law Review 222, 224 ["The No Property Rule"]. 
28 Thomas H Murray "On The Human Body As Property: The Meaning Of Embodiment, 
Markets, and the Meaning Of Strangers" (1987) 20 Journal of Law Reform 1055, 1061 ["The 
Human Body As Property"]. 
29 Pierce v Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetary (1872) 10 R.I. 227 [Pierce]. 
30 Pierce above n29, 242. 
31 Pierce above n29, 243 . 
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judgment has been applied in the United States is that the "trustee" is the owner 
of the piece of land in which the body is buried, rather than family members. 32 
Property rights have also been found in blood plasma, 33 cell lines34 and even 
excrement, provided there is express intention to maintain control over it. 35 
However in perhaps the most well known case involving human body parts the 
existence of property rights was rejected, albeit vaguely; yet the case was a 
catalyst for a whole new debate on the existence of these potential rights. In 
Moore v Regents of the University of California36 John Moore was diagnosed 
with a rare leukemia, and his spleen was removed. Doctors then used the spleen 
to create a cell line which had medical applications worth billions of dollars. 
While the California Court of Appeal found that Moore had a property right in 
his spleen (and its applications), the Supreme Court of California rejected this 
argument and found for Moore based on breaches of fiduciary duty and lack of 
informed consent. 
In a rather consequentialistic argument which seemed to put development of 
medical research ahead of individual rights, the Court believed that any 
property right would be too high a burden on biomedical research. 37 While this 
argument would prevent the use of body parts for research, a similar utilitarian 
stance could be used to support the case for using body parts for transplantation, 
and the existence of a body parts market. This illustrates that in deciding 
whether property rights exist in the human body, different considerations may 
apply depending on the particular use of the body or part. 
32 "Whose Body?" above n7, 202. 
33 United States v Garber (1979) 607 F 2d 92 (5th Cir). 
34 Diamondv Chakrabay (1980) 447 US 303. 
35 Venner v Mary land (1977) 30 Md App 599. 
36 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1991) 271 Cal Rptr 146 (Sup Ct) [Moore] . 
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C New Zealand 
1 Case Law 
There has been little discussion of the no-property rule in New Zealand; the 
most apparent is Hammond J' s obiter comments in the case concerning the 
body of Billy T James.38 Upon the entertainer's death, his body was embalmed 
and taken to his family home in preparation for a church funeral in several days 
time. However a group of distant Maori relatives took the body (without 
consent of James' widow) to be placed in a marae prior to its interment, in 
accordance with Maori custom. 
The court case arose by way of a defamation claim against a weekly newspaper, 
brought by one of the Maori relatives who objected to being called "Billy's 
body snatching uncle" . Hammond J found this to be fair comment on a matter 
of public interest, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal. 39 However more 
interesting are the judge's further comments relating to the last wishes of Billy 
T:40 
At common law a person does not ' own' his or her body. But those persons 
responsible for the estate of a deceased person have a duty to see to a proper 
burial according to law.. . An executor has the right to a body for burial 
purposes, even against the wishes of the widow.. . Here nobody had a 
common law right to Billy T's body at the relevant time. But the body was in 
lawful possession of the widow and those in the Muriwai [James' family 
home] house. 
This is basically a restatement of the rule in Williams that while a body is not 
property, limited custodial rights exist for disposal purposes. 41 
37 John Martinez "A Cognitive Science Approach to Teaching Property Rights in Body Parts" 
(1992) 42 J Legal Educ 290, 293 . 
38 Awa v Independent News Auckland Ltd [1995] 3 NZLR 701. 
39 Awa v Independent News Auckland Ltd (1995) unreported, Court of Appeal, CA 9/96. 
40 Awa v Independent News Auckland Ltd above n 38. 710. 
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2 Statutory restrictions 
If the human body and its parts are to be regarded as property, then many of the 
limitations that occur will be imposed by the state.42 However not all 
restrictions are necessarily a recognition of property rights;43 property-
independent rights exist that apply irrespective of ownership interests.44 For 
example, rights set out in the Code of Health and Disability Services 
Consumers' Rights operate regardless of whoever owns those parts. 45 Right 7 
(9) states: 
Every consumer has the right to make a decision about the return or disposal 
of any body parts or bodily substances removed or obtained in the course of 
a health care procedure. 
Additionally, Right 7(10) states: 
Any body parts or bodily substances removed or obtained in the course of a 
health care procedure may be stored, preserved or utilised only with the 
informed consent of the consumer. 
Similarly, consent provisions in any anticipated IVF legislation, such as the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Bill 1998 or the Human Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Bill 1996, using wording such as "belong" need not be interpreted 
as evidence that the law has adopted a proprietary model for managing 
embryos.46 
This avoidance of property rights can also be seen in New Zealand's key piece 
of legislation relating to bodies, namely the Human Tissue Act 1964 which 
41 "The No Property Rule" above n 27, 227. 
42 "Spleen for Sale" above n 5, 506. 
43 "A Question of Property" above n 3, 346. 
44 J W Harris "Is Property a Human Right?" (Seminar Paper, Property and the Constitution 
Seminar, NZ Institute of Public Law, July 1998). 
45 The Health And Disability Commissioner (Code Of Health And Disability Services 
Consumers ' Rights) Regulations 1996 [Code Of Health And Disability Services Consumers ' 
Rights]. 
46 "Proprietary Rights" above n J 6. 251. 
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applies when tissues or organs are taken from a dead body for any other reason 
than to determine the cause of death. Section 3 of that Act allows specific uses 
of a body only after obtaining consent from "persons in lawful possession". 
Those particular purposes and requirements of consent are expressed in section 
3(1): 
3 ( 1) If any person, either in writing at any time or orally in the presence of 2 
or more witnesses during his last illness, has expressed a request that his 
body or any specified part of his body be used after his death for therapeutic 
purposes or for purposes of medical education or research, the person 
lawfully m possession of his body after his death may, unless he has reason 
to believe that the request was subsequently withdrawn, authorise the 
removal from the body of any part or, as the case may be, the specified part, 
for use in accordance with the request. 
"Lawful possession" is defined in section 2(2), and includes persons in charge 
of hospitals, mental hospitals and penal institutions. Notably, the subsection 
grants lawful possession "Without limiting the rights, powers, or duties of any 
person entitled under any rule of law to the possession of any body ... " This 
could be interpreted as allowing for the possessory rights as expressed in 
Williams, but having those possessory rights temporarily overridden by the 
provisions of the Act due to its necessity. 
Unlike in Australia (which has a similar legislative scheme), Hammond J's 
comments in Awa have suggested that "lawful possession" in New Zealand 
does not necessarily presuppose ownership. 47 Therefore the Human Tissue Act 
is another example of a working framework for the control of dead bodies and 
body parts that does not resort to a property approach. 
This is not to say that the Human Tissue Act and its operation is not without 
problems. Those in lawful possession of a body are only allowed to remove 
tissue and organs with the consent of the individual, as stated in section 3(1). 
47 "The No Property Rule'· above n 27, 228. 
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However in certain circumstances section 3(2) allows such removal without 
consent: 
3(2) Without limitmg subsection (1) of this section, 1t is hereby declared that 
the person lawfully in possession of the body of a deceased person may 
authorise the removal of any part from the body for use for the said purposes 
if, havmg made such reasonable inquiry as may be practicable, he has no 
reason to believe---
(a) That the deceased person has expressed an objection to his or her body 
being so dealt with after death, and had not withdrawn it; or 
(b) That the surviving spouse or any surviving relative of the deceased 
person objects to the body being so dealt with. 
To assist in the operation of the consent provisions, a Health Department Code 
of Practise supplements the Act. 48 The Code acknowledges that the Act has no 
legal requirement for those in lawful possession of a body to inform relatives of 
the deceased 's wishes, yet tates that it is desirable to approach relatives and 
inform them of those wishes. If the relatives oppose any removal, the Code 
states that the person in lawful possession may decline to authorise the removal. 
It has been suggested that this allowance is a recognition of the limited 
possessory rights in Williams and their superiority to the statute, 49 however if 
this is true then Parliament should have made the intention clearer by including 
provisions in the principal Act that concerned the consent of relatives. 
The Code presents a similar problem in situations when the deceased has made 
no request regarding removal of their tissue or organs. 50 Section 3(2) allows 
organ removal once having made "such reasonable inquiry as may be 
practicable" that either the deceased or surviving spouse or relatives had made 
no objection. The Code however sets a very low standard for "reasonable 
inquiry as may be practicable", requiring the person in lawful possession of the 
body only to discuss the matter with "any one relative who has been in close 
48 A Code of Practice for Transplantation ofCadaveric Organs, 1987 [Code of Practice]. 
49 Susan Pahl "Removal of Body Parts: The Legal Position"(l993) NZLJ 144, 144 ["Removal 
of Body Parts"]. 
50 "Removal of Body Parts" above n 49, 145. 
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contact with the deceased" in order to obtain the views of the deceased and all 
other relatives.51 As Pahl notes:52 
Ironically then, if the Hospital follows the guidelines, a person who has 
made no request regarding the disposition of his or her organs or tissue may 
be more likely to become a donor than the person who specifically requested 
that his or her organs or tissue can be used. 
From the preceding discussion it is therefore submitted that a clear distinction 
must be drawn between possessory rights imposed by statute and possessory 
rights created by common law. While both are important, each has a different 
function; the statutory framework for the regulation of therapeutic use, medical 
education and research, and the common law rights for the purpose of final 
disposal by burial or cremation. Obviously these two situations will often 
conflict, and so some system of priority should be established. 
3 Cultural issues 
Relatives who refuse to allow the removal of organs or tissue, whether in 
accordance with the deceased' s wishes or not, are often motivated by religious 
and cultural reasons. Different cultures often have differing views of death and 
how the human bod should be treated upon death, and this is particularly 
relevant in New Zealand' s multi-cultural society where Maori and Polynesian 
beliefs often attach a strong significance on the sanctity of the body as a 
whole.53 
In a recently released paper, the Ministry of Maori Development has identified 
a number of cultural concepts and issues relevant to health care and body 
parts. 54 Central to this is Whare Tapa Wha, a holistic approach to health care 
51 Code of Practice above n 48, iv. 
52 "Removal of Body Parts" above n 49, 145. 
53 New Zealand Law Commission Coroners: A Review: A Discussion Paper: PP36 
(Wellington, 1999) 4 [Coroners: A Review] . 
54 Ministry of Maori Development Hauora o te Tinana me ona Tikanga: Service Providers 
(Wellington, 1999) 11 [Hauora o te Tinana me ona Tikanga]. 
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and well-being symbolised by four walls of a strong house; wairua (spiritual 
well-being), hinengaro (mental well-being), tinana (physical well-being) and 
whanau (social well-being). A person 1s considered to be healthy only if all four 
walls are strong, and insensitive treatment of the body can affect any of these 
foundations. 55 Maori consider that all parts of the body contain a life spirit 
passed down from ancestors which is contributed to by each generation and 
passed on to future generations. 56 Furthermore, some particular body parts such 
as the head are considered tapu or sacred, and so must be treated with greater 
sensitivity. 
The possibility of organ donation is new to Maori, and given the increasing 
need for donated organs by the Maori community it is seen as a gift of taonga. 
For example, despite the fact that the rate of Maori dying from kidney-related 
disease is four times greater than for non-Maori, traditional reluctance to 
separate body parts from a dead body means that the high demand for organs is 
not being met by a sufficient supply. 57 Even when organs are available, there 
are further issues associated with accepting another's body part; especially 
when the recipient is unaware of the identity of the donor or their whakapapa. 
Cultural considerations must be taken into account when dealing with body 
parts. In its ever-broadening scope as a founding document of New Zealand, the 
Treaty of Waitangi underpins the provision of health services to all New 
Zealanders.58 The Crown's obligation to protect tikanga and tino rangatiratanga 
should allow Maori to determine how their body parts are to be treated. 59 One 
of the best ways to achieve this is to ensure a continual process of consultation 
with Maon; not only with the individual patient and their whanua, but also iwi 
and hapu on a more general level. The Code of Practice states that:60 
55 Hauora o te Tinana rne ona Tikanga above 11 54, 12. 
56 Coroners: A Review above 1153, 9. 
57 Hauora o te Tinana me ona Tikanga above n 54, 16. 
58 Hauora o te Tinana me ona Tikanga above n 54, 10. 
59 Treaty of Waitangi. Ko te Tuarua (Article the Second). 
6° Code of Practice above n 48. 3. 
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[I]t is generally reasonable to assume that if the patient belonged to an ethnic 
or rehg10us group whose members usually object to the removal and use of 
the organ and tissue m question then the patient would have objected to its 
removal and use. 
18 
The Ministry of Maori Development has also provided a guide for service 
providers which assists them in respecting Maori values and tikanga. 61 It asserts 
that client wishes are paramount, but whanau should be involved if the client 
wishes. Maori health concepts should be acknowledged in both policy and 
procedures, and information should be provided specifically for Maori clients 
and whanau. In relation to body parts, health professionals should assist patients 
and their whanau in making informed decisions, and where requested the body 
parts should be returned in a culturally appropriate manner. 
These and other recommendations are hardly burdensome on health providers; 
in fact many of the suggestions apply not only to cultural sensitivity but also 
general good practice. It has been suggested that most people would have 
similar feelings and attitudes towards the treatment of their or their family ' s 
body parts, but because Maori often have a closer connection with a body upon 
death, they are in a better position to be aware of the treatment.62 
In such situations perhaps cultural considerations should be dominant, not only 
for traditional reasons but also in accordance with various statements of anti-
discrimination in New Zealand legislation.63 This approach is also consistent 
with Right 1(3) of the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' 
Rights which states:64 
Every consumer has the right to be provided with services that take into 
account the needs. values, and beliefs of different cultural, religious, social, 
and ethnic groups, including the needs, values, and beliefs of Maori. 
61 Hauora o te Tinana me ona Tikanga above n 54, 20. 
62 "Removal of Body Parts" above n 49, 148. 
63 See New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. sl9: Human Rights Act 1993, s21. 
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Cultural attitudes towards body parts ( and especially their removal and use) 
illustrate another very different view of the body altogether. It is a view that is 
even further from a property view than our current perception of the body, and 
this should be taken into account when determining the legal framework to 
govern this area of medicine and law; a first and foremost reason against the use 
of property rights in the human body is its cultural offensiveness to a significant 
section of the population. 
64 Code Of Health And Disability Services Consumers ' Rights, above n 45 . 
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III INAPPROPRIATE USE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BODIES 
A Moral Objections 
Regardless of whether the current law relating to bodies and body parts is or is 
not based in a property system, there are strong arguments that it should not be 
so. These arguments can be divided (perhaps somewhat arbitrarily) into two 
main categories; first that property rights are, by both their nature and effect, 
inappropriate to impose upon the human body, and secondly that such an 
imposition is unnecessary as other alternatives are possible and more desirable. 
One of the arguments that property rights are inappropnate is a moral objection 
to classifying human beings (and to a lesser extent their parts) as property. 
While such an argument has little immediate legal force, the law is based upon 
moral principles, 65 and therefore any development in the law should be 
consistent with its moral environment. 
As a further qualification, it is important to note that the strength of many 
arguments will vary depending on certain factors. The body or body part in 
particular, the intended use, and the relevant right in the "bundle" (for example 
a possessory or transferability right) will all affect the validity of any 
objection. 66 However it is hoped from the discussion below that a general 
picture will emerge and assist in forwarding a total argument against property 
rights in body parts. 
1 The human body 
Self-ownership is often the basis for property-specific justice reasons. 67 A clear 
example is the Lockean concept of a natural property right in labour; the "fruits 
of labour" argument. 68 Under this approach an individual's ownership of his or 
65 Lord Devlin The Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977) 71. 
66 "The Human Body as Property" above n 28, 1075. 
67 "Who Owns My Body?" above n 24. 65. 
68 John Locke The Second Treatise of Government Ch V. 
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her body is the presumption that enables them to own things external to 
themselves. 69 Harris states the argument simply as: 
1. IfI am not a slave, nobody else owns my body. Therefore 
2. I must own myself Therefore 
3. I must own all my actions, including those which create or improve 
resources. 
Without examining the issue of whether labour is a natural property right, it is 
obvious to see the extraordinary leap in logic between statements 1 and 2, 
which Harris terms "the spectacular non-sequitur" .70 The reasoning does not 
provide for the option that no one owns the human body. Perhaps a better 
starting point is by way of what Harris labelled a "bodily-use freedom 
principle", from which external ownership can be justified and moral objections 
against body ownership can be made.71 
The existence of bodily-use freedom does not presuppose ownership of the 
human body. The bodily-use freedom principle was used without resorting to 
ownership claims by the minority in the House of Lords in R v Brown.72 Lord 
Mustill argued that the criminal law should not interfere in sado-masochistic 
activity between consenting adults due to a right of bodily freedom. However 
he did not express that this freedom was derived from the individuals having 
property rights in their own bodies.73 If Lord Mustill had based a bodily-use 
freedom argument on the presence of human property rights, it is difficult to see 
where any lines could be drawn between permitting the activities in Brown and 
allowing more serious harm in practices such as duelling, which even the 
minority objected to . 
69 Michelle Bourianoff Bray "Personalising Property: Towards a Property Right in Human 
Bodies" (1990/9 1) 69 Tex L Rev 209, 212 ["Personalising Property"]. 
70 "Who Owns My Body?" above n 24. 71. 
71 "Who Owns My Body?" above n 24, 63. 
72 R v Brown [1994] l AC 212 (HL). 
73 "Who Owns My Body?" above n 24, 64. 
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Moral objections to property in the human body can be religious or secular 
based, 74 although often the basis of their objections is similar. A Christian view 
is that as the body is a creation of God, it is a sacred thing and sacred things 
should not be within the realm of commerce. 75 A similar but more secular view 
is that the body should be respected due to its uniqueness, as illustrated by 
Kass:76 
What kind of property is my body? Is it mine or is it me? Can it be alienated, 
like my other property, like m car or even my dog? And on what basis do I 
claim property rights m my body? Have I laboured to produce it? Less than 
did my mother, and yet it is not hers . Do I claim it on merit? Doubtful: I had 
it even before I could be said to be deserving. Do I hold it as a gift - whether 
or not there be a giver? How does one possess and use a gift? Is it mine to 
dispose of as I wish - especially if I do not know the answer to these 
questions? 
However many modern advocates of a no-property rule are merely echoing 
arguments made over two hundred years ago by philosopher Immanuel Kant 
(1724 - 1804). Indeed much of Kant' s views on the human body continue to 
shape laws today. 77 Kant proposed that the notion of property rights in the 
human body is an affront to human dignity.78 He asserted that all humans have 
dignity, or wiirde . This dignity is unconditional and incomparable; it is a virtue 
of humanity than cannot be affected so as to lessen it. Dignity is priceless, and 
so differs from anything with a market price. If humans have property rights in 
their body or parts, it would conflict with their dignity. 79 Kant identifies this as 
a "subject-object dichotomy" :80 
74 "The Human Body As Property" above n 28, 1068. 
75 "The Human Body As Property" above n 28, 1071. 
76 "The Hwnan Body As Property" above n 28, 1073. 
77 "A Question of Property" above n 3, 360. 
78 Stephen R Munzer "An Uneasy Case Against Property Rights in Body Parts" in Ellen 
Frankel, Fred D Miller Jr and Jeffrey Paul (eds) Property Rights (CUP, 1994) 259,266 ["An 
Uneasy Case"]. 
79 Stephen R Munzer ·'Kant and Property Rights in Body Parts" (1993) 6 Canadian Journal of 
Law and Jurisprudence 319. 326 ["Kant and Property Rights"]. 
80 Immanuel Kant ''Lectures on Ethics" (trans Louis Infield, rev ed 1930) 165. 
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Man cannot dispose over himself because he is not a thing; he 1s not his own 
property; to say that he 1s would be self-contradictory; for m so far as he is a 
person he 1s a SubJect m whom the ownership of thmgs can be vested, and if 
he were his own property, he would be a thing over which he would have 
ownership. But a person cannot be a property and so cannot be a thing which 
can be owned, for it is impossible to be a person and a thing, the proprietor 
and the property. 
2 Body parts 
23 
Of course it is difficult to extend this type of analysis to body parts; how can the 
use of human tissue (especially replenishable items) offend human dignity? 81 
Nozick identifies the problems in extending a Kantian analysis to lesser things. 
In Anarchy, State & Utop,a he states :82 
But could there be anything morally intermediate between persons and 
stones, something without such stringent limitations on its treatment, yet not 
to be treated merely as an object? One would expect that by subtracting or 
diminishing some feature of persons, we would get this intermediate sort of 
bemg. 
Under such an analysis, Nozick suggests that all "lesser beings" could be 
infinitely harmed for the sake of one " full being" . 83 Yet under this approach is 
the possibility that a " lesser" person, for example by way of physical or menta 
capacity, could be ranked of lower moral status. Any such result would have the 
opposite effect of what instilling an inherent dignity is attempting to do. 
One solution is to argue that dignity extends beyond the physical integrity of 
the body to the values that the individual holds, including an interest in 
81 "The Human Body As Property" above n 28, 1074. 
82 Robert Nozick A narchy, State & Utopia (Basil Blackwell Ltd, Oxford, 1974) 39 [Anarchy, 
State & Utopia] . 
83 Anarchy, State & Utopia above n 82, 41. 
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separated parts 84 Once a body part is removed, the individual still retains some 
"moral interest" in it and so should be able to control what happens to it as part 
of their right to self-determination. It has been suggested that this type of 
dignitary interest already has some implicit recognition in other areas of law; a 
right to privacy allows an individual to control their name and likeness, and 
before death an individual has a right to decide what is to happen to their 
remains. 85 Both are intangible and yet important to a person, as is the use of 
body parts. 
Another possible argument is that a degree of human dignity exists in body 
parts, where the status of any given body part is similarly derived from the 
status of the whole. The level of commodification of a body part may vary 
depending on three related factors; the nature of the body part, the reason for 
the transfer, and the appropriateness of the use. 86 
(a) the nature of the part 
Kant himself made a distinction between body parts integral to the functioning 
of the body - such as kidneys or (according to Kant) testicles - and body parts 
that were not as vital - such as hair or fingernails. 87 If the more essential body 
parts (usually organs) were treated as commodities it was a greater offence to 
dignity because they were of greater importance to the whole body. In today's 
biotechnological environment such a distinction may prove inadequate; genetic 
material in hair or fingernails can be just as useful as the same material in 
kidneys, thus making the totality of Kantian dignity more difficult to dispute. 
However there are a number of other ways body parts can be defined as to vary 
their insult to dignity. 
84 Sharon Nan Perley "From Control Over One's Body To Control Over One's Body parts: 
Extending The Doctrine of Informed Consent" (1992) 67 NY UL Rev 335, 349 ["Control 
Over One's Body"]. 
85 "Control Over One's Body'· above n 84, 350. 
86 "An Uneasy Case" above n 78, 276. 
87 "An Uneasy Case" above n 78, 268. 
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An obvious distinction is based on biological necessity. 88 Body parts that are 
replenishable, naturally shed and have no risk in their removal may face less 
resistance to commodification. At the other end of the spectrum there are body 
parts that have an associated loss or risk or even morbidity in their removal, for 
example a kidney or cornea. This is especially so if the removal is inter vivas -
while the donor or seller is still alive. Potential markets for body parts include 
not only supply during life or after death, but also a "futures market" where the 
seller would receive an annual payment in return for any useable body parts on 
their death. 89 
A further differentiation is the level of personal attachment to the body part 
(obviously not literally) . There may be certain "emotionally loaded" body parts 
that also provoke a conflict with Kantian dignity if commodified, regardless of 
their biological necessity.9° For example, the sensitivity and emotional 
attachment surrounding reproduction may result in increased attachment to 
gametes, testicles, ova and placentas. 
Emotional attachment to body parts may come from a sense of identity that they 
possess. We define who we are in terms of our physical selves, and removal of 
certain body parts could lead to a loss of identity, even after death.91 Organs 
such as eyes, skin and the heart may be susceptible to an identity attachment, 
and the recent developments in transplantation of whole body parts (most 
infamously that of a hand transplant) could cause similar feelings of a loss of 
identity. 
(b) the nature of the removal or transfer 
If a body part is made a commodity, by definition it is bought and sold. It is 
therefore unclear what the status of donations would be; either no offence to 
dignity or merely voluntary commodification. Kant argues that even donation 
88 "An Uneasy Case" above n 78, 261. 
89 "An Uneasy Case" above n 78, 262. 
90 ''Who Owns My Bodv?" above n 24, 76 . 
91 "Personalising Prope;1y·' above n 69. 240. 
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of essential organs is morally wrong, 92 however it is difficult to see how a 
humanitarian gesture of donation is morally objectionable. If it is the selling 
itself which is so reprehensible, this can only be because transferring a body 
part for money is a superficial and objectionable reason to sell, especially for 
any body part with great biological necessity or emotional attachment. 93 
As an advocate of donation as a means of organ and tissue transfer, Murray 
regards gifting as a necessary assertion of community.94 While it can be argued 
that the right to buy and sell body parts is an exercise of individual liberty that 
the law should not prevent, Murray states "gifts of the body are one of the most 
significant means mass societies have to affirm the solidarity, or community, 
that humans need in order to mature and flourish as individuals."95 
Although donations to known recipients may create and sustain personal 
relationships, the case is more difficult when attempting to explain impersonal 
gifts. The most obvious example 1s the donation of blood, although other 
examples have been found; for example when US President Eisenhower 
suffered a heart attack many living Americans offered their own hearts.96 Even 
when systems have been established that compensate for the giving of blood 
( either through payment or "blood insurance" where it is guaranteed that blood 
will be available for donors), free donation has remained and flourished .97 
Murray suggests that this generosity is also derived from the nature of 
· 98 community: 
We affirm our solidarity when we give of ourselves - literally - to fellows in 
need. We give out of generosity and because we need community; we need 
to affirm our connectedness m the face of the many forces in mass society 
that dnve us apart 
92 "Kant and Property Rights" above n 79, 327. 
93 "An Uneasy Case" above 11 78, 270. 
94 "The Human Body As Property" above n 28, 1085. 
95 "The Human Body As Property" above 11 28, 1085. 
96 Guido Calabresi "Do We Own Our Bodies?" in Bernard M Dickens (ed) Medicine and the 
Law (Dartmouth Publishing Co. London, 1993) 6 ["Do We Own Our Bodies?"]. 
97 "The Human Body As Property" above n 28, 1087. 
98 "The Human Body As Property" above n 28, 1088. 
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However should this liberality fail , could the law ever be used to force the 
giving of a body part? Such coercion is not as improbable as one might think; 
English statutes in the eighteenth century allowed the bodies of hanged 
murderers to be dissected, and a United States judge has demanded that 
prisoners "donate" blood.99 In another case an individual unsuccessfully tried to 
force his cousin into giving vital bone marrow. 100 Occasions like these are rare, 
but 
. . 
mcreasmg emphasis on autonomy and individualism alongside 
biotechnological advances may cause further problems. Calabresi proposes that 
our acceptance of any type of law forcing individuals to give body parts 
depends on our attitude to property. 101 If another Chernobyl-type accident 
occurred and there was great demand for bone marrow, he foresees necessary 
support for a law demanding donation. Calabresi even likens any such rule as 
an extension of the social contract we have with the state; our "bodies" can be 
appropriated for military service or jury duty, so why not our individual body 
parts?102 
( c) the appropriateness of the use 
A final factor which may influence how body parts are seen as commodities is 
the intended use of the body part. Consider the difference between selling blood 
to someone m desperate need of a transfusion and selling blood to be used as a 
prop in a horror movie; or, as one commentator has suggested, the difference 
between selling skin for a graft for a burn victim and selling skin to be used as 
upholstery.103 These are extreme and far-fetched examples, yet they illustrate 
how there may be a difference between the need for an organ or tissue for life-
saving purposes, and the same or different organ or tissue required for reasons 
of comfort or appearance. It can be argued that in certain cases the benefit 
99 Lori B Andrews "My Body. My Property" in Elizabeth Mensh and Alan Freeman (eds) 
Property law (Vo l 11) (Dartmouth Publishing Co, London, 1992) 32 ["My Body, My 
Property"]. 
100 McFa/1 v Shimp (1978) 10 Pa D & C 3d 90. 
101 "Do We Own Our Bodies?" above n 96, 7. 
102 "Do We Own Our Bodies?" above n 96. 3. 
103 "An Uneasy Case" above n 78, 276. 
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gained from the transfer may outweigh any disadvantages associated with the 
necessary commodification. 
One inherent difficulty in taking into account these three "mitigating moral 
factors" is that it is inconsist with the totality of Kantian dignity. In order to 
make such concessions, that one body part is more important than another or 
that one method of giving is morally superior to another, would require a 
rethink of the fundamental principle behind the supposed digmty concern. 
Otherwise the Kantian notion that one cannot use a person for another's benefit 
becomes largely self-justifying and unworkable.104 
3 Personhood and property 
An extension of Kant's ideas can be seen in the work of Margaret Jane Radin 
who emphasises a relationship between personhood and property.105 Property 
can be categorised as somewhere on a continuum between personal property 
and fungible property, where personal property is defined as being part of the 
person; it is an intuitive view which is best measured by the pain if the property 
is lost, or the inability to reimburse the loss.106 Under Radin's theory, personal 
property gives a stronger moral claim than mere fungible property, although it 
is still defined as property. 
Radin originally asserted that the human body was personal property as it was 
"literally constitutive of one's personhood" .107 Like other types of personal 
property, body parts could become fungible through a change of ownership. 
Radin later identified the "paradox" in this analysis that the human body may 
be so personal to not be property at all. 108 While similar to Kant's dignity 
approach, Radin ' s personal property is based on individual attributes or 
104 "Do We Own Our Bodies?" above n 96, 12. 
105 Margaret Jane Radin "Personhood and Property" (1982) 34 Stan L Rev 957 ["Personhood"]. 
106 "Personhood" above n 105. 960. 
107 "Personhood" above n 105, 966. 
108 "Personalising Property" above n 69, 214. 
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endowments. Therefore loss to personhood is a subjective matter, rather than 
loss based on some "undifferentiated Kantian moral agency." 109 
According to Radin, if the human body is regarded as beyond the sphere of 
property due to an inherent personhood then the body and body parts are 
"market-inalienable" - they have a worth beyond the market. 110 A market-
inalienability analysis allows for quasi-property rights in body parts that permits 
donation but not sale. 11 1 Therefore market-inalienability invokes only limited 
non-transferability, which "places some things outside the market-place but not 
outside the realm of social intercourse." 112 If people tum themselves into 
commodities, the humanity of everyone declines. Radin uses this premise to 
make arguments against the sale of human organs, as well as against 
prostitution, baby selling, and surrogate motherhood. 
It is arguable that the paradox identified by Radin - that the human body is 
property so personal so as to not be property at all - is a self-defined problem. 
Creating a continuum of property which ranges from absolutely fungible to 
absolutely personal so as to be beyond the sphere of property inevitably creates 
a difficulty in distinguishing what is offensive to personhood and what is not. A 
further argument against Radin 's ideas is that a similar loss to personhood may 
arise from desperate social conditions which force a person to commodify their 
body. The loss of personhood is an effect of wider social justice reasons 
irrespective of whether the commodification was permitted or not. 113 
109 Margaret Jane Radin Contested Commodities: The Trouble with Trade in Sex, Children, 
Body Parts & Other Things (Havard University Press, London. 1996) 34, 60 [Contested 
Commodities]. Radin goes so far to say that Kantian persons (and dignity) are so objective to be 
mere fungible units. While Kantian objectivity is beneficial for promoting equality, it is less 
useful for determining individual loss through commodification. 
110 Margaret Jane Radin '·Market-Inalienability" (1987) 100 Harv L Rev 1849 ["Market-
Inalienability"]. 
111 "Personalising Property" above n 69, 239. 
112 Contested Commodities above n 109, 18. 
113 Contested Commodities above n 109, 125. 
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B Public Policy Arguments Against Property Rights 
A second and alternative argument that property rights in the human body may 
be inappropriate states that although the body and tissue could be property, it is 
against public policy to make it so. 114 This can be traced back to early English 
cases such as Sharpe, where the reason that the law would not allow property 
rights over a dead body in those circumstances (unauthorised reburial) was that 
it would offend public notions ofreligion, health and decency.115 
Conversely, public policy can also be used to argue m favour of allowing 
ownership in certain circumstances. 116 Therefore in situations such as Williams, 
it is in the public interest that somebody is responsible for the burial of a body. 
Additionally, if lawful possession is based on public policy, then institutions 
such as museums and medical schools should be able to own human bodies. 
This interpretation has a similar result to the skill and labour exception in 
Doodeward. Unfortunately the issue becomes more difficult when "public 
good" is less obvious, especially when it may be in conflict with an individual's 
rights or benefits. For example in Moore there is definite public good in the cell 
line being developed from Moore' s spleen, and yet it is difficult to say at whose 
benefit this should be made 
Another disadvantage to the public policy approach is that by allowing 
"property rights" in some cases and not in others, there is a loss of certainty 
which is one of the few advantages that a property system has. To leave the 
classification of body parts as transferable or not (and in what circumstances 
they may be so) to judicial interpretation would create further difficulties in 
practice. This 1s especially the case with developing technology and uses that 
may take time to reach to courts. 
114 "Proprietary Rights" above n 16, 254. 
11 5 "Proprietary Rights" above n 16. 239. 
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C Practical Consequences of a Body Parts Market 
All abstract concepts of dignity and personhood aside, there are practical 
reasons against allowing property rights in body parts, based upon the typical 
commodification that will result on an open market. 117 Admittedly some of 
these arguments are stronger than others, and some are only relevant to 
particular body parts and particular uses such as organ transplantation. 118 
The first problem is that those already disadvantaged in society will feel forced 
to sell body parts, with market demand creating a price they cannot refuse. An 
illustration of this problem occurred in 1989 when the infamous tissue dealer 
Count Ranier Rene Adelmann von Adelmannsfelden sent the following letter to 
names appearing in German public bankruptcy records: 119 
Dear Bankrupt Person, 
I have obtained your name from court documents. Your bankruptcy is a 
matter of public record. as is the fact that no one should do business with 
you, that no one can grant you credit, that the police probably have a file on 
you, and, finally. the anyone who associates with you places himself under 
suspicion ... as soon as you donate your kidney you will receive the money 
from the association treasury. (You can also donate a kidney belonging to 
your wife or your relatives.) You will be able to work at once. Your life will 
be saved. and the loss of a kidney 1s consolable. 
Countless examples exist closer to home. Wealthy patients have offered huge 
sums for kidneys in order to avoid hospital waiting lists. Beneficiaries have 
offered to sell kidneys to escape from mounting financial debt. Most recently, 
in August 1999 the following posting appeared on the internet auction site 
eBay:120 
11 6 "Proprietary Rights" above n 16, 241. 
11 7 "Spleen for Sale" above n 5, 508. 
11 8 "The Human Body As Property'· above n 28, 1075. 
11 9 "A Question of Property" above n 3,372. 
120 <http://www. ebay.com> 
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Fully functional human kidney for sale. You can choose either kidney. Buyer 
pays all transplant and medical costs . Of course only one for sale, as I need 
the other one to hve Senous bids only 
32 
The invitation was quickly removed by site administrators, but not before 
bidders had raised the price to $US5 . 7 million, although it is unknown how 
many of those offers were serious. Nevertheless, the selling of body parts, in 
addition to other medical developments such as surrogacy, may create another 
way of dividing society into restrictive classes that are beyond the control of the 
individual 121 
This creates a second problem in that some of the poor and disadvantaged 
individuals who may be forced to sell human tissue would be malnourished, 
alcoholics or drug users. These conditions affect the quality of the body parts 
and their viability for transplantation or research purposes. The inferiority of the 
tissue may outweigh the benefits of an increased supply.122 
Although this argument applies less to human organs and tissue sold for 
research purposes, especially where there is no hardship on (and even a benefit 
to) the original donor, it can still be argued that the cost of medical research 
would mcrease because of the need to obtain control over a body part even 
when this may not be necessary. Using the Moore case as an example, if the 
researchers had been required to "buy" Moore's spleen (or its information) 
before conducting research or even operating, John Moore could have held his 
spleen to ransom (at least until he died from leukemia) unless he was suitably 
compensated. Given that researchers may not know the potential commercial 
value of the biological material of any particular patient, having to secure these 
rights in every case would be financially arduous. 
Thirdly, in the presence of any such market, organ donations will cease, 
especially in more generic body parts (such as blood) where there is no 
relationship between the donor and the donee. A spirit of generosity can only go 
121 "Personalising Property" above n 69, 242 . 
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so far; forcing people to purchase organs will inevitably increase the costs of 
the entire transplantation process.123 
These difficulties suggest that the free market is not an appropriate system for 
body parts, and especially organ donation. There is a variance between the cost 
to the supplier and the value to the recipient, thus creating supply and demand 
pressures. 124 Indeed Murray even suggests that the free market itself is an 
inappropriate model upon which to place body parts. 125 He identifies two 
problems; the assumptions applied to a market model not applying to body 
parts, and the "moral externalities" that economics omits. 
Of the assumptions made in a market model, perhaps the most inappropriate is 
that human beings behave rationally. It is a presumption that is only tenuously 
applied to consumerism, and so care should be taken when applying it to 
something much more sensitive and emotional as body parts. Even if it can be 
said generally that people make rational decisions. there are still those who 
cannot - for example children and the mentally incapacitated - for whom 
rationality cannot be assumed. It is these people who would need extra 
protection within a market of buying and selling body parts. Related to 
vulnerability 1s the likelihood of abuse within a market; fraud, 
misrepresentation and coercion are all possible. This type of abuse is obviously 
not limited to body parts markets, but in those situations its effect would be so 
much greater than in other circumstances. 126 For example fraud in a commercial 
contract may result in financial loss, whereas fraud in the sale or purchase of a 
vital organ may lead to ill-health or even death. 
A final assumption made by free market proponents that is difficult to apply to 
a market in body parts is that desire and need are the same thing. 127 A 
discrepancy would inevitably exist between what people would pursue m a 
122 "Spleen for Sale" above n 5. 508. 
123 "Spleen for Sale" above n 5, 509. 
124 "The Human Body As Property" above 11 28, 1076. 
125 "The Human Body As Property" above 11 28, 1078. 
126 "The Human Body As Property" above n 28, 1078. 
127 "The Hwnan Body As Property" above n 28. 1079. 
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market and what people require for their well-being. This could apply both 
ways; individuals may desire more on a body parts market than they need, but 
also not be able to obtain from the market what they desperately need. 
Murray also identifies "moral externalities" that the market does not pick up. 
As discussed, feelings of disrespect, devaluation and desecration of the human 
body and body parts fail to enter into a simple market contract. A more tangible 
extemality would be damage to personal relationships; for example the 
relationship between family members requiring genetically-related body parts, 
and also the relationship between patient and doctor which may be jeopardised 
by a lack oftrust. 128 
128 "The Human Body As Property" above n 28, 1081. 
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IV UNNECESSARY USE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BODIES 
Not only is a property regime inappropriate for human bodies and body parts, 
but it may also be unnecessary. Current law or relatively simple developments 
to the law could work as a suitable legal framework for bodies and human 
tissue. As one commentator tates : 129 
The common law (and the common lawyer) are renowned for creativity; but 
that creativity needs to be tempered by a reminder that justice and 
community interest are not always best served by the introduction of new 
theories of liability. 
Attributing elements of property to the human body and body parts, while not a 
new concept, has been emphasised by developments in biotechnology, as 
illustrated by the Moore case. Before recent advancements in science increased 
the possible uses of organs and tissue. the common law rule in Williams had 
operated relatively trouble-free. Therefore it is likely that new problems are 
likely to arise in association with these new medical developments, and so 
require legal controls 
However any attempted regulation of the human body and body parts should 
give regard to important factual distinctions that may be present in a wide range 
of uses for the body and body parts.130 Different scenarios require different 
solutions. Separate treatment should be given to organs or tissue obtained from 
living and dead donors. If the donation is inter vivas, special attention should be 
paid to the capacity of that individual to make decisions about their body. A 
third distinction relates to the organs themselves and their necessity; for 
example whether they are regenerative or not, and whether they are paired or 
non-paired organs. Finally some relevance should be placed on the role of the 
family and of hospitals - something evidently acceded to in New Zealand's 
own legislation. 
129 "Proprietary Rights" above n 16, 243. 
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A Using Current Law to Regulate Human Bodies 
There are many existing rules that can be used to regulate activities involving 
body parts, whether organ donation and transplantation, biotechnological 
research or assisted reproduction. The following examples show how some of 
these areas of law can operate to control body parts. Note however that this is 
not intended to be an exhaustive list of laws applied to the human body; the 
attraction of this approach is that in light of new and unpredictable needs to 
control the use of body pans, current law is able to meet all eventualities as they 
occur. Clearly existing statutes and cases already referred to that deal 
specifically with these issues - such as the Human Tissue Act 1964, despite its 
already identified problems - are also evidence of the satisfactory nature of 
existing laws, which do not adopt a property-based approach. 
1 Criminal law 
Although instances may be rare, the criminal law could be used to prevent the 
theft of body parts . Stories of tourists waking in a bath of ice water with their 
kidneys missing exist as urban legends, however more down to earth examples 
such as the theft of b1olog1cal material for research purposes are certainly more 
probable. 
Section 217 of the Crimes Act 1961 gives a definition of things that are capable 
of being stolen: 
Every inanimate thmg whatsoever, and every thing growmg out of the earth, 
which is the property of any person, and either is or may be made moveable, 
is capable of being stolen as soon as it becomes moveable, although it is 
made moveable in order to steal it. 
Clearly this definition relies on the thing stolen as being "the property of any 
person", and therefore it is difficult to maintain a no-property approach. While a 
130 The Body as Propert v above n 2. 253. 
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similar rule could be developed to include body parts as capable of being stolen, 
care must be taken not to create such a rule where body parts are not property 
only in name. Incorporatmg the human body and body parts into a law 
previously applied only to property may signify that they are to be treated as 
such. Arguments have been made that the criminal law is still useful by relying 
on the theft of storage containers or facilities taken or interfered with, 131 
however applying the law based on such technicalities appears forced and, even 
worse, could give rise to inappropriate loopholes when a container is not stolen. 
Similar arguments can be made agamst relying on trespass of the premises 
where the body parts are being held. 132 
There are recent examples where the criminal law has been applied to the 
"theft" of body products when urine samples obtained for the purpose of testing 
alcohol levels were illegally disposed of In R v Welsh 133 the defendant poured 
his urine sample down the drain before it could be tested. The case was reported 
as an appeal against sentence, and the Court only mentioned the theft in passing 
as a "technical offence". Whether the urine could be regarded as property or not 
was not considered. 134 however if it had been then the intention to maintain 
control over the sample may have become relevant 
In another similar case, R v Rothery, 135 the issue was framed to specifically 
avoid the issue of property rights. In that case the defendant illegally took his 
blood sample with him when he left police custody, and so was liable for failing 
to give a blood sample as a statutory offence. 136 Even though property was not 
an issue, the issue was framed so as to apply to removmg the container rather 
than the blood in it. 137 While these two cases involve body products that are 
replenishable and of little value and therefore may be more susceptible to be 
regarded as mere property, the courts are not willing to make that classification. 
131 "Proprietary Rights .. above 11 16. 243 . 
132 Trespass Act 1980. s 3. 
133 R v Welsh [1974] RTR -+78. 
134 "Proprietary Rights·' above n 16. 244. 
135 R v Rothery f1976J RTR 550 (CA). 
136 Road Traffic Act 1972 (UK). s 9(3). 
137 "Proprietary Right s·· above 11 16. 245. 
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Regardless, the current law is able to manage these situations without having to 
rely on labelling the body parts as property. 
2 Tort law 
There are further avenues in tort law that may assist in regulating the control of 
body parts without resorting to a property approach. Both intentional torts (such 
as assault and battery) and unintentional torts of negligence could be applied to 
a range of situations involving body parts, but are most easily applied when a 
third party is involved; for example a medical practitioner. 
The principle of inviolability of the body is the cornerstone of intentional tort 
law; any unwanted touching may constitute trespass to the person.138 An assault 
requires a direct and intentional threat that causes apprehension of an imminent 
battery; 139 therefore any threat to remove a body part or take biological 
material, even if that threat is conditional, may constitute an assault. If that 
threat is intentionally carried out, then a battery has been committed. A 
common and necessary exception to a claim of battery 1s that the touching was 
impliedly consented to . As stated in Wilson v Pringle: 140 
Generally speaking, consent is a defence to battery: and most of the physical 
contacts of ordinary life are not actionable because they are impliedly 
consented to by all who move in society and so expose themselves to the risk 
of bodil contact 
In most cases involving body parts, this exception 1s of little value; most 
interference with body parts goes well beyond ordinary touching. However 
there may be cases where biological and genetic material such as skin and 
blood samples can be taken without invasive and obvious touching. In that 
situation, it ma be difficult to maintain that a battery had been committed, 
unless the purpose of the touching could be included as a decisive factor. 
138 Jn Re F (Menral Patient - Sterilisation) [1989] 2 WLR 1063, 1082. 
139 Police v Greaves 1196-+I NZLR 295. 
140 Wilson v Pringle 11987 j J QB 237, 251. 
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There may be many instances where the negligent action of another causes loss 
related to body parts. Often this will be the inadvertent disposal of a body part 
following an operation where that body part should have been kept. 141 However 
any such claims are significantly affected by New Zealand's accident 
compensation scheme, which instates a statutory bar on actions for 
compensatory damages from personal mjury claims. 142 The definition of 
personal injury includes death, physical injuries and mental injuries, 143 and can 
be caused not only by accident but also by other grounds, including medical 
misadventure. 144 Under section 3 5 of the Accident Insurance Act 1998, medical 
misadventure is defined as personal injury caused by medical error or medical 
mishap. Medical error is subsequently defined as the failure of a registered 
health professional to observe a standard of care and skill reasonably to be 
expected in the circumstances, 145 and medical mishap occurs when properly 
given treatment results in adverse consequences that are severe, and unlikely to 
have occurred under the given treatment. 146 
Situations may arise where a claim in negligence over damage or loss to body 
parts will therefore be barred under the scheme. For example, a medical 
professional failing to obtain informed consent over a procedure in which 
organs or tissue are removed would constitute medical error, 147 and so the 
patient would be entitled to compensation. 
However there are other instances where the Accident Insurance Act 1998 does 
not apply and a negligence claim may be permitted; when the action is not 
related to a personal injury (notably when the effect is nervous shock suffered 
by another), 148 or a claim for exemplary damages. However it should be noted 
that New Zealand courts have held that exemplary damages will only be 
141 For example. see Dohson above n r. 
142 Accident Insurn11ce Act 1998. s39-l . 
143 Accident lnsunmce Act 1998. s 29. 
144 Accident Insurn11ce Act 1998. s 39. 
145 Accident Insurance Act 1998, s 36(1). 
146 Accident Insurance Act 1998. s 37. 
147 Accident Insurance Act 1998. s 36(2)(a)(i). 
148 Queenstown lakes D,stricl Co uncil v Palmer [1999] l NZLR 549 (CA). 
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awarded in cases that are "rare and exceptional", 49 and in the case of 
unintentional torts, would require a very high level of negligence. 
Where the action 1s not related to a personal injury (as defined by the Accident 
Insurance Act), the accident compensation bar does not apply. This is of great 
significance when seeking to regulate body parts, as often separating parts from 
the body causes no injury at all . Obviously the normal requirements of a 
negligence claim appl y - a duty of care, and a breach of that duty which causes 
loss - and so some damage must have occurred. In the case of genetic and 
biological material , a strong case can be made that economic loss is likely to be 
suffered following a negligent act; for example, if somebody had thrown away 
the cell line developed from John Moore' s spleen. While courts are often 
reluctant to extend negligence into areas of economic and consequential loss, 150 
developing the law in this area would provide an adequate control for these 
problems without requ iring a property right to be infringed. Naturally some 
limits would have to be imposed on how consequential the loss is, but 
remoteness of damages has always been a fundamental feature of the law of 
torts.151 
Another possible damage that could be claimed is mental injury, or nervous 
shock. The exact med i ea! nature of nervous shock. or Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder as it is more frequently known is often unclear, and expert evidence is 
often conflicting; 152 unfortunately this confusion has been matched in the legal 
area. However it has been found in England that nervous shock does not have to 
be caused by the apprehension, or actual sight, of injury to a human being. In 
Owens v Livetpool Co,poration, 153 an action in negligence was allowed against 
the defendant, who had driven a tramcar into a funeral procession causing the 
coffin to be overturned in front of relatives of the deceased, some of whom 
suffered from nervous shock. It could be argues by analogy that seeing the 
149 McLaren Tra11.1por11 · ,','11111erville ll996] 3 NZLR-l24. 
150 Spartan Steel & Allays /,/c/ 11 Martin & Co Ltd [1973] l QB 33. 
151 Overseas Tankship ({ 'f.... 1 /,/d v J\!orts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (I'he Wagon Mound No 1) 
[1961] AC 388. 
152 For example. see l 'emo11 1· Bosley (No 1) [1997] l All ER 577. 
153 Owens v Liverpool ( 'r)lporation I 1939] l KB 394. 
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destruction of your own body parts could give rise to a similar claim, although 
its success may depend on the particular body part. As previously discussed, 
certain organs and tissue have a special emotional and personal attachment, 
which if lost or damaged may be more likely to cause mental suffering. 
One example that causes considerable difficulty is the negligent loss of 
gametes, 154 which could quite easily happen at an in-vitro fertilisation facility. 
For some people, sperm and ova are seen as replenishable and invaluable body 
products, but fo r others there may a much stronger personal attachment. What 
rights individual s have over post-fertilisation embryos (and what rights them 
embryos have themselves) is another matter entirely and is beyond the scope of 
this paper; yet it is unlikely that a property label would be desired in any 
situation. 
3 Fiduczaty la11 
Using fiduciary law to govern the treatment of body parts again only applies 
where a third party causes the problem and can be held to owe an equitable 
obligation. However in many cases medical professionals will easily fit into this 
category, and they are often at the cause of problems associated with body 
parts. The doctor-patient relationship is not by definition a fiduciary 
relationship, instead it merely gives rise to a wide number of fi duciary 
obligations. 155 It is arguab le that the doctor-patient relationship should be a 
fiduciary one ( and so benefit from the prima facie expectation that fiduciary 
obligations exist), as it exhib its the three hallmarks of such relationships as 
identified by Wil son J in F1w ne v Smith. 156 First, the doctor has scope for the 
exercise and di scretion of power over the patient; second, the doctor can 
exercise that power to affect the patient's mterests; and third, the patient is 
vulnerable to the doctor' s power. 
154 "My Body, My Propcm··· abo\'c n 99. 29. 
155 Sidaway v Board o/Ciu1'enwrs o/the Beth/em Royal Ho!)pital [1985] AC 871. 
156 Frame v Smith ( 1986) -+2 DLR(-+"') 81. 99. 
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Regardless of these arguments, certain well-established fiduciary obligations 
exist, including a duty of confidence, a duty to perform proper treatment in 
good faith, and most relevant to the regulation of body parts, a duty to avoid 
any conflict of interest. This would be particularly relevant where the medical 
practitioner is also involved in research or organ transplantation, and has the 
opportunity to betray the patient's trust and loyalty to gain advantage for 
themselves, their research or another patient. The clearest example of this is the 
Moore case, but also in New Zealand in Green v Matheson 157 it was alleged that 
a doctor had included cervical cancer patients in a research project without 
obtaining their consent 1 -x 
4 New Zealand Hill of Rights Act 1990 
The right and freedoms in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 may also 
provide an avenue to regulate the use of body parts without relying on a 
proprietary interest The relevant rights are contained in section 8 (the right to 
not be deprived of life except on grounds of fundamental justice), section 9 (the 
right not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment), section 10 (the right not 
to be subjected to medical or scientific experimentation) and section 11 (the 
right to refuse to undergo medical treatment) . 
In Simpson v Attorney-Genera! (Baigent 's Case}' 59 it was held that in 
appropriate cases, damages could be awarded as a result of a breach of the 
rights in the Act. Therefore the Act may provide a useful remedy for more 
serious cases relevant to body parts, such as unauthorised experimentation or 
organ removal. It should be noted that under section 3 of the Act, the Bill of 
Rights only applies to act done by the government or "by any person or body in 
the performance of any pub! ic function, power, or duty conferred or imposed on 
that person or body by or pursuant to law" .16° Consequently a claim is only 
possible if the entity breaching the rights is performing a public function, 
157 Green v Matheson 11 9891 3 NZLR 564. 
158 The case was later settled out of court before any judgment was delivered on the breach of 
fiduciary duty claims. 
159 Simpson v Attorney-( ie11ernl (/3aigent 's Case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
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although it could be argued that health providers (whether publicly owned or 
not) fit into this category and so are covered by the Bill of Rights. 
5 Privacy and the body as information 
One specific type of body matter that may be subject to further legal protection 
is genetic material. The classification of genetic material goes beyond the 
distinction between "person" and "property", as it can also be regarded as 
information 161 Indeed it is often the information contained within the physical 
genetic material that 1s of any use or value to researchers, and so perhaps 
protection based on the information rather than the substance itself may be 
more useful. 
An information-based approach does not deny that the protection of the 
physical existence of the genetic material is also possible. Because of the strong 
connection between a person and their genetic material, laws usually applying 
to persons could be used to govern biomedical research. As Litman notes: 162 
Human genetic material emanates from, and is integral to human beings. It is 
also of profound importance 111 the biological process of constituting human 
beings. Accordingly, it \\'ou ld not be illogical to legally characterize genetic 
material as ··person" rather than "property" 
Under such an analysis, fiduciary duty and informed consent theories can be 
used to protect genetic material by requiring full disclosure of the use of that 
material. This was the position taken by the Supreme Court in Moore, when 
Panelli J stated that it was not necessary "to force the round pegs of 'privacy' 
and ' dignity ' into the square hole of ·propeny' in order to protect the 
patient . .. " 163 
160 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. s 3(b). 
161 "The Legal Status of Genetic Materiai"" above n L 18. 
162 "The Legal Status of Genetic Material" above n l. 19. 
163 Moore above n 36. 158. 
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The unique feature of genetic material is that while the substance itself is 
tangible, it has an equally important incorporeal side.164 Gene sequences 
contain vital information that scientists have only recently begun to understand 
through the establishment of the Human Genome Project. 165 It is information 
that is, while important, also common to everyone, and like all such 
information, it is regarded as "common property" - a term used to describe 
something that is owned by everyone, or perhaps more realistically, owned by 
no one. 166 
There are however exceptions to this rule. Certain genetic information may be 
patentable as intellectual property when some inventive step has been made to 
create a new and industrially applicable use.167 However the property rights 
granted are an exceptional case, based on the policy that those developing an 
invention should be rewarded for the cost and effort incurred. Therefore 
intellectual property should not be used to argue that pnvate property exists in 
all unpatented genetic information. 
A second exception to the general rule that information is not protected applies 
when that information is private or confidential. Such information is not 
protected as a property right, but merely as an interest that deserves legal 
protection.168 Certain genetic material contams information that is clear y 
confidential, such as medical information about future health risks that would 
jeopardise an individual obtaining employment or health insurance. When this 
particular genetic information can be linked to an individual, then a privacy 
interest capable of legal protection exists. 
164 "The Legal Status of Genetic Material" above n L 19. 
165 The Human Genome Project is an international coordinated effort to determine the complete 
flene sequence of over 80,000 genes. <http: //www.er.doe.gov/production/ober/hug_top.html>. 
66 "The Legal Status of Genetic Material .. above n L 19. Litman suggest that using the term 
"common property'· illustrates the tendency to characterise things as property even when they 
are not. 
167 Patents Act 1953. s 2: /Ve/lcome Foundation Ltdv Commissioner of Patents [1983] NZLR 
385. 
168 "The Legal Status of Geneti c M:1terial'· above n 1, 20. 
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ote that this protection should only apply to genetic information that is 
somehow unique to an individual (or group of individuals), which is a factor 
that Rothman J A of the Californian Court of Appeal failed to distinguish in 
Moore .169 He attempted to analogise the situation in Moore with the rule in 
Lugosi v Universal Picfl(res170 which granted a proprietary right in the actor 
Bela Lugosi' s famous persona (although the right did not survive the actor). If 
there wa a property right in a persona that was an expression of a person' s 
genes, then there must be a property right in those genes. This argument was 
rejected by the Supreme Cou11, and rightly so; whereas Lugosi ' s persona was 
created by a unique expression of genetic material, John Moore had no such 
umqueness in hi s spleen (except a higher concentration of RNA due to the 
cancer).171 
There is no existing privacy law in ew Zealand preventing the appropriation 
of information for another's benefit. The United States has a series of "false 
endorsement" cases ( often involving the unauthorised use of the likeness of a 
celebrity 172) that could be used as a grounds for granting protection of genetic 
information. However New Zealand 's Privacy Act 1993 may also assist in 
controlling the collection, use, storage and disclosure of genetic information.173 
The Privacy Act I 993 regulates the collection, use and disclosure of personal 
information (about an identifiable individual) by agencies (most public and 
private organisations 174) through a series of Information Privacy Principles.175 
Genetic information is often about an identifiable individual, and so would be 
defined as "personal information" under the Act. 176 Particularly relevant to 
genetic information are Pri ncipl es 3, 10 and 11. Principle 3 requires an agency 
collecting personal information to inform the individual concerned of the 
169 Moore v Reients o/tl,e U111Fersity of" a/ifornia ( 1988) 249 Cal Rptr 494 (Ct App) . 
170 Lugosi v Universal />1cture.1 (l 97<J) 603 P 2d -425 . 
171 "A Quesuon of Propeny'· above n 3, 357. 
172 For example. see Betle ,\/idler PI,. Ford Nfotor Co and Young & Rubicon Inc (1988) 849 F 
2d 460, where a car advertisement featuring a song imitating the style of singer Bette Midler 
was held to be ru1 unauthorised appropriation ofMidler' s voice. 
173 Privacy Act l 993, Long Litl e. 
174 Privacy Act 1993. s 2 
175 Privacy Act 1993. s /'i 
176 Privacy Act 1993. s 2 
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collection, its purpose, who 1s collecting it and what nghts of access and 
correction the ind ividual has. Principle 10 restricts an agency from using 
personal informat ion for any other purpose than for which it was collected. 
Principle 11 limits the di sclosure of personal information to another body. 
These provisions could prevent the unauthorised appropriation and use of 
genetic information by researchers, totally independent of any rights over the 
source material itself 
6 Consumer /a11 
The purpose of consumer protection legislation is to readdress the increasing 
inequalities m bargaining power between sellers and consumers. In the 
provision of health services that inequality is emphasised by the consumer's 
lack of medical knowledge and often the necessity of the situation. For these 
reasons, it may be appropriate for services such as organ transplantation to be 
covered by consumer legislation 
The Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 provides a en es of implied warranties 
when goods or services are supplied to a consumer. Therefore the preliminary 
question must be whether a process such as organ or tissue transplantation is a 
good or service that fall s within the Act. The organ that is transplanted could be 
a good, however to speak of a good implies a proprietary interest that, as 
previously stated. is undesirable. 177 The question of whether consumer 
protection legislation app lies to the provision of blood has been addressed in 
Australia when a number of people were infected with the mv virus from 
contaminated blood .178 They sought to use the implied warranties under 
Australia ' s co mparab le Trade Practices Act 1974. which required the blood to 
be "maten als supplied in connection with provision of services" .179 In E v 
177 Consumer Guarantees Act 1993. s 2 .. good" includes "Goods attached to. or incorporated in, 
any real or personal property'·. 
178 PQ VA ustra!ian Reel ( 'ros.,· .\'ociet \ r 1992) I YR J 9: E VA ustralian Red Cross Society and 
Others (1991 ) 99 ALR 60 I [E 1·. lustrnlia11 Red Cross]. 
179 Trade Practi ces Act 197-t (AUS). ~ 7-l (J ). 
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Australian Red Cross Society and Others Wilcox J held that blood might be 
materials, 180 but this does not necessarily imply that blood is a good, 181 
A better solution 1s to regard the whole transplantation process as a service as 
defined in section 2 of the Consumer Guarantees Act: 182 
"Service" means anv nghts. benefits. privileges. or facilities that are or are 
to be provided. granted. or conferred by a supplier under any of the 
following classes of contract: 
(a) A contract for. or 111 relation to. -
(1) The performance of work (mcluding work of a professional nature), 
whether with or without the supply of goods ... 
The transplantation of an organ will consequently be a service under the Act so 
long as it was carried out under a contract. This is easily established when the 
operation is performed by a private health provider, but the situation is less 
clear when the transplantation occurs within a public health system. Hopefully 
an implied contract or even social contract with the state could be used by the 
courts on policy grounds of consu mer protection to include these circumstances 
within the Act. 
If an organ transplantation is a service for the purposes of the Consumer 
Guarantees Act 1993 then two implied warranties are relevant. Section 28 
guarantees that the service is carried out with reasonable care and skill, and 
section 29 guarantees that the service is reasonably fit for any particular 
purpose (which is likel y to be the survival or good health of the consumer). 
Should either of these guarantees be breached, the consumer is entitled to a 
range ofremedies 183 Some of them may not be appropriate (such as repair), but 
section 32(c) allows for liability for reasonably foreseeable consequential loss 
caused by the breach which may prove valuable to an organ donee. 
180 E v A ustralian Red ( 'ross above n 178. 6-1-6 
181 "P . R.i I .. b ~ '7 ropneta.I) g 11 s a O\'e n I< >. L.-+ 
182 Consumer Guararnees Act 199:\ s 2 "service .. (2)(a)(i). 
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These examples illustrate that existing rules are sufficient to govern current 
uses of body parts, and so property rights are therefore unnecessary. It is also 
argued that the current law is robust and flexible enough to manage advances in 
technology and the use of body parts, again without having to adopt a property 
regime. However it should be noted that there are instances where the current 
law should not adapt to meet the circumstances, which are those that have 
previously been identified as morally repugnant. For example, a market in body 
parts could be governed by various pieces of contract legislation, but the 
inappropnateness of a body parts market at all should prevent this. 
The solution given in this paper, that property rights are totally inappropriate in 
the human body and body parts, is an extreme view. There are commentators 
who suggest that the total abandonment of property rights in the body is too 
impractical to maintain, and so propose a range of property rights that are 
market-inalienable. 184 Market inalienable property rights would allow body 
parts to be transferred as a gift, but they could not be exchanged for 
consideration. However as previously discussed, it becomes difficult to draw 
the line at which aspects of property are allowed and which are not, thus 
creating a confusi on that a prope11y right approach is supposed to avoid. To 
propose a "no-property at all " argument may appear less practical, but it is 
undoubtedly safer 
Furthermore, many apparent current uses of property rights may not be 
required, but rather mere trespassory rules; those which impose obligations on 
every person not to '·use" the prope11y in question without the consent of those 
that have some relationship with the property. 185 Trespassory rules in the human 
body clearly exist, there are laws banning murder, assault and rape for example. 
To speak of ownersh ip and property is therefore only rhetorical, so that " ... such 
183 Consumer Guaramccs Act I 993. s 32 
184 "Personalising Property .. abO \'C 11 69. '15 : '"M,u-kc1-!11alienability" above n 110. 
185 "Who Owns My Body r abO\e 11 2-t Cl3. 
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invocations may add pithiness and force to what would otherwise seem 
laboured and tame." 186 
B An Alternative - Extending tlte Doctrine of Informed Consent 
Currently the doctrine of informed consent is of little use to regulate the use of 
body parts . As the doctrine is premised on an individual' s bodily integrity and 
right to self-determination, it is narrowly interpreted to only apply to 
information about risks and benefits directly concerning the patient, and not 
what becomes of body parts removed from them.187 
Assuming that some people would object to certain uses of their body parts 
(whether on financ ial, religious or moral grounds), it may be possible to extend 
the doctrine to include such concerns.188 However this would necessitate a 
recasting of the principles behind info rmed consent; "bodily integrity" would 
have to include body parts If so, then individuals could accept, refuse or place 
restrictions on the use of their body parts 189 This may be a better approach to 
consent than the one taken by the upreme Court of California m Moore, which 
was based on the fiduciary duty between Moore and his doctor. In most cases 
however, it is unlikely that the GP will also be the researcher (as it was in that 
case) and a general doctrine of info rmed consent may extend to a wider range 
of circumstances. 
Extending the doctrine of informed consent is only one example of how current 
law could successful ly adapt to meet the increasing uses of body parts. Yet it is 
also an example of the difficulti es faced if an individual does not look after 
their own interests. because in many cases it is the responsibility of that 
individual to take action At what stage does an extended doctrine of informed 
consent (and other laws) become too paternalistic? 
186 "Who Owns My Bod, r above n 2-t, 6-t. 
187 "Control Over One· s ·Bod,·· above 11 8-t . 3-t6. 
188 "Control Over One· Bod~ ·· ,1bove 11 8-t. 357. 
189 "Control Over One·s Bod~ .. :1b0\·e n 8-t. 359. 
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V CONCLUSION 
"Some of the finest advances in society have resulted from a refusal to 
characterise human beings . as property " 190 
This paper has asserted that it is both incorrect and unrequired to instil a 
property regime in human bodies. Despite the range of vague and elusive 
definitions of property that exist. Harris suggests that all people seem to share 
an intuitive sense of what property is. influenced by the environment, time and 
culture. 191 Therefore it must be asked whether in our current legal, medical and 
technological environment there is an intuitive sense that the human body 
should be classified a property. 
The arguments presented in this paper against property rights in the human 
body are vaned and diverse. ranging from moral regnancy to practical 
consequences So too are the illustrations of the existing law's ability to manage 
current and arising circumstances. It is a cumulative argument; each matter is 
required to counter the strength of a property approach. For as Litman states: 192 
The legal institution of prope1ty exists for an indeterminate number of 
reasons . It exist~ to encourage producti\'ity. to reduce conflagration, to 
enhance autonom:-, . to pro\·tde for sustenance. secunt and pnvac , and for 
numerous other reasons In principle. therefore. the more objects of property, 
the better. 
Yet even if prope11y \\ as the simplest and most workable system for the 
management of body parts. especiall y co mpared with the existing ad hoe 
system, there is still strong resistance to 1t. For to speak of people as property 
seems to be no great innovat1on, but rather has all the hallmarks of a great leap 
backwards. It opens up an array of dangerous consequences, some of which we 
are yet unable to contemplate. 
190 "My Body. My Propcn, ·· abo\·c n 99. 36. 
191 "Who Owns My BodYT abO\·e n 2-l. 58 
192 "The Legal Status of Genetic Material" above n I. l8 . 
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Earlier thi s century ownership of human bodies would be readily conceded to 
and evident in the form of slavery. While this view has changed (either to self-
ownership or absence of any property interest), increasing technological 
advances and commercial opportunities are forcmg us back down that path. 
Creating a pro perty insti tution in body parts also underestimates the flexibility 
of the current law to adapt to meet new problems as they arise, so long as the 
law keeps in !me with those changes. Therefore Jo truly succeed in the 
regulation of the human body and its parts, a close relationship between the 
law, medicine and technology must be maintained. 
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